Court of Appeals to hear local cases at Sequim High School February 12th
Sequim, WA - 1/7/03 - In a community visit on Wednesday, February 12th, the Washington State Division Two Court of Appeals will hold court in Sequim High School's auditorium, hearing arguments in a total of six cases throughout the day.
"We're delighted to be hearing local Clallam and Jefferson County cases at Sequim High School," said Chief Judge J. Robin Hunt of the visit. "We hope to provide the students and the greater community with a valuable educational experience and a first-hand knowledge of how Washington's appellate courts operate."
Starting at 8:30 a.m., Chief Judge Hunt and Judges David Armstrong and J. Dean Morgan will hear arguments on the following cases (case summaries follow) before students, teachers and observers:
· No. 27948-7, C. EDWARD AND BECK J. UPTON v. JEANINE GOFF,
The Court will hear argument on the first three cases in the morning hours, recessing for lunch at 11 a.m., when they will meet with students over lunch in the cafeteria and be available to answer their questions. The court will reconvene at noon to hear argument on the last three cases of the day. Throughout the day, the court will try to provide opportunities for students to ask questions between cases as time permits.
Division Two of the Washington State Court of Appeals has made community
visits throughout its geographic area since 1993, most recently hearing
cases at Peninsula College School in October. The court hears appeals
from trial courts throughout Western Washington, Pierce County south
to the Oregon border and the Olympic Peninsula, and has the authority
to overrule, remand, or modify or affirm decisions of the lower courts.
CONTACT: Chief Judge J. Robin Hunt, Court of Appeals Division II, 253-593-2976.
# # # # #
Division Two Case Summaries
Nature of Case:
Facts: In June 1994, Cascade Investment Properties ("Cascade") recorded the Lone Pine Acres plat with the Clallam County Auditor, including six lots capable of residential development. It also filed a Declaration of Easement with Covenants and Restrictions Affecting Land, which (1) created a Lot Owners Association ("Association"); (2) gave the Association a perpetual, non-exclusive easement for ingress, egress, and utilities; and (3) empowered the Association to, among other things, maintain and improve the easement, regulate its use, and grant additional easements. Cascade placed a "water system" on this easement, essentially a large well with metered water lines running to the six residential lots. Cascade did not reserve an express easement for the system.
Cascade sold the five of the six residential lots between May 17, 1994 (sales to Goff, Kenton, Connely, Lyster, and Upton. Cascade also sold "water share certificates" for $4,000 to lot purchasers deciding to use the water system. Each certificate stated that it "entitles one (1) metered water share for residential use," signed by Cascade. Some sales documents described the "water share" as a "hook-up fee" or stated that no shares in a water company were sold. In Water Facilities Inventories filed with the Clallam County Department of Health since 1994, Cascade has named itself as "owner" of the system.
From the time lot owners purchased their lots and water shares, they paid monthly water fees to Cascade. But Cascade sold its remaining interest in the water system, including the "pump house, well, distribution lines, and meters," to the Uptons for $2,000 on December 17, 2000. The instrument does not appear to transfer any interest in land.
Then, the other lot owners, defendant-appellants in this action ("lot owners" or "Association"), decided to hold their first lot owners' association meeting on December 21, 2000, the minutes of which reflect their decision to declare ownership of the water system. The Association, purporting to be the true owner, changed the locks on the pump house and denied the Upton's access to the system.
The Uptons sued (1) to quite title to the water system, (2) to enjoin the Association from interfering with the system, and (3) for damages on trespass and conversion theories. Members of the Association responded that title should be quieted in them. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the Uptons prevailed. The other lot owners appeal.
No. 28721-8, STATE OF WASHINGTON, RESPONDENT V. JEREMY K. HARFORD, APPELLANT
Nature of Case:
Facts: On December 26, 2001, Bettina McMasters, Michael Ingram, and Jeremy Harford were at McMasters' home in Jefferson County, Washington, hanging out and talking. Ingram had his dog, Monte, with him. At one point Masters took a long nap, but awoke to hear Ingram and Harford arguing and to see Harford hit Monte with his fists. When Ingram leaned over to grab Monte, Harford hit Ingram in the face, knocking him down. Harford then grabbed Ingram's head and banged it into the floor. When McMasters tried to pull Harford off Ingram, Harford struck her as well. Harford then went back to Ingram and began kicking him. Ingram crawled outside to the driveway, but Harford followed him, kicking him repeatedly. McMaster yelled at Harford to leave, which he eventually did.
While McMasters was attending to Ingram's wounds, Harford came back to the driveway area and resumed kicking and assaulting Ingram. After McMasters yelled at Harford again, he ran at her and began assaulting her, leaving a short time later.
Deputies Tracer and Apeland, from the Jefferson County Sheriff's Department responded to McMasters's 911 call. McMasters related the evening's events to Tracer, who observed Ingraham's facial injuries. The deputies took McMaster to Harford's trailer so that she could identify him. Tracer and Apeland entered the residence and tried to wake Harford. The deputies observed blood around Harford's mouth and a strong odor of alcohol. When he awoke, the deputies gave Harford Miranda warnings and handcuffed him.
Harford began to resist and began kicking at the deputies. Harford head butted the patrol car several times and made obscene statements. As Tracer tried to put Harford in Apeland's patrol car, Harford intentionally hit his own head on the door frame of the car. During the entire drive to the jail, Harford made spontaneous statements to Apeland.
A jury convicted him of second- and third-degree assault.
No. 28477-4, STATE OF WASHINGTON, APPELLANT v. CHARLES ALEX NALL, RESPONDENT
Nature of Case:
Nall later appeared in the Multnomah County Circuit Court on a different matter but the court also signed an order terminating probation. Due to clerical error, the March 31, 2000 warrant was not quashed. Both parties agree that the warrant should have been quashed.
On November 5, 2001, Clallam County received a fax from the Multnomah County Sheriff requesting service of the March 31, 2000 warrant. After receiving erroneous information verifying that the warrant was valid, deputies arrested Nall at his Clallam County home. In the search incident to that arrest, the deputies discovered methamphetamine.
The State appeals.
No. 28781-1, MIKE BELENSKI, APPELLANT v. JEFFERSON CO DISTRICT COURT ET AL, RESPONDENTS
Nature of Case:
Nature of Case:
Gormley filed a motion for summary judgment and sent notices of this motion to the Brockmeiers. During a telephonic conference, Carolyn was on the line, but Albert was not present. Carolyn requested a continuance because Albert had suffered a heart attack and was unable to travel to Washington. (Albert lived in California.) At this conference, Gormley's attorney moved to depose Albert. Carolyn was not aware of this "surprise motion." Carolyn also argues that Albert was not aware of this motion as well. Carolyn notified the court that she could not consent to the deposition on Albert's behalf. According to Carolyn, the court predicated its granting of a continuance upon Gormley's "off the cuff request for a deposition in the State of Washington from Mr. Brockmeier."
The deposition was set and notices were mailed. Carolyn received Albert's notice and vice versa. (Carolyn and Albert lived in California at this time.) Carolyn and Albert did not appear for the deposition. The Gormley's moved for summary judgment, which the court granted. The Brockmeiers appeal.
No. 28486-3, BRADLEY JEVONS, APPELLANT V. STATE OF WASHINGTON, v. RESPONDENT
Nature of Case:
Jevons sued the Department for negligence. The trial court granted summary judgment for the Department, ruling that the Department did not owe a duty to Jevons. Specifically, the court found that the Department was not liable as a landowner, that it did not retain control over Wilder's work and was not liable under common law, and that it did not have supervisory authority over Wilder's work sufficient to invoke Washington Industrial Safety and Health Act (WISHA) liability. RCW 49.17. On appeal, Jevons challenges only the trial court's finding that the Department was not liable under common law and WISHA.
In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. Section 107, any copyrighted work in this message is distributed under fair use without profit or payment for non-profit research and educational purposes only. [Ref. http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/107.shtml]